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AND REALITIES OF CLASS ACTION AND
OTHER LARGE SCALE LITIGATION
DEBORAH R. HENSLER*
I.  INTRODUCTION
In 1979, Professor Arthur Miller published an article contrasting
the myths and realities of class action litigation in the United States.
To some, Professor Miller wrote, the class action lawsuit seemed a
“Frankenstein monster,” while to others it appeared as a “knight in
shining armor.”  In truth, he argued, class action litigation neither
posed the monstrous burdens and risks perceived by its opponents,
nor did it offer the promise of achieving an ideal society in our time.1
Professor Miller wrote during an era of high controversy in the
United States about class action litigation.  In 1966, the Civil Rules
Advisory Committee had amended the federal class action rule—
Rule 23—in important ways.2  Although some members of the
committee said their goal was to facilitate civil rights and other class
actions aimed at social reform,3 to the business community it looked
as if the as if the main effect had been to spur more and bigger
Copyright  2001 by Deborah R. Hensler.
* Judge John W. Ford Professor of Dispute Resolution, Stanford Law School and Senior
Fellow, RAND Institute for Civil Justice.  This work was partially supported by funds from the
RAND Institute for Civil Justice and RAND endowment funds.  Research assistance was pro-
vided by Craig Coleman and Andrea Wendt.
1. See Arthur Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and
the ‘Class Action Problem,’ 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 665 (1979).
2. On the adoption of the 1966 amendments, see Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of
the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L.
REV. 356 (1967); Charles Joiner, The New Civil Rules, 40 F.R.D. 359 (1966).
3. Still others described the changes as purely “technical.”  For a description of the pur-
ported objectives of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee in drafting Rule 23, see Judith Resnik,
From “Cases” to “Litigation”, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 5; John Frank,
Response to the 1996 Circulation of Proposed Rule 23 on Class Actions, in Working Papers of
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules on Proposed Amendments to Rule 23 1997 [hereinafter
Working Papers of the Advisory Committee], at 264, 266 (Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, Vol. 2, 1997) (describing the era in which Rule 23 emerged as “the apogee of the
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as if the main effect had been to spur more and bigger damage class
actions against them.4
Today there is again a sense that monsters are loose in the land.
Some believe that American courts are overrun with class litigation—
a phenomenon that is about to inundate the courts of other countries
as well.  Many ordinary Americans seem to think that class actions
are a new-fangled litigation device invented by greedy plaintiff attor-
neys.  (Outside the United States, the characterization is “greedy
American plaintiff attorneys.”)  Many American legal scholars seem
to think that mass tort litigation and its attendant challenges for
courts are a result of certifying mass tort lawsuits as class actions.
Many American journalists who have been following the litigation
against tobacco companies, gun manufacturers, and managed care or-
ganizations (including class and non-class lawsuits) seem to think that
using class actions to pursue social policy reform is a new idea.  It is
harder to find shining knights in popular and professional discourse
defending class action litigation than it was twenty-five years ago.5
But today, as yesterday, there is a need to distinguish class action
myth from class action reality.
For the past several years, with colleagues at the RAND Institute
for Civil Justice, I have been studying class actions for money dam-
ages in the United States.6  In separate studies, my colleagues and I
have also sought to understand the challenges to the legal system
posed by mass torts.7  I have also become interested in the new social
policy torts: suits against tobacco and gun manufacturers and against
managed care organizations (“HMOs”).  What follows is a synthetic
analysis of the nature of class action and other large-scale litigation in
Great Society”); William T. Coleman, Statement On the Proposed Amendments to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23 Before the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, in Working Papers of the Advisory Committee
at 449, 456 (Administrative Office of the United States Courts Vol. 4, 1997) (noting that some
originally saw Rule 23 as a means of “deputizing all attorneys everywhere to enforce our laws”).
4. For discussion of the business community’s reaction to the 1966 amendments to Rule
23, see generally DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC
GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN (2000) [hereinafter, CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS].
5. The shining knights do have a tendency to come riding out of the mists whenever sig-
nificant changes in class action rules are proposed, as was vividly demonstrated in the late 1990s’
debate over the Civil Rules Advisory Committee’s proposed amendments to Rule 23.  See
CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS, supra note 4, at 25-31.
6. The written product of the RAND group’s research is contained in CLASS ACTION
DILEMMAS, supra note 4.
7. See, e.g., DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS: THE CHALLENGE
OF MASS TOXIC TORTS (1985); Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass
Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961 (1993).
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the United States at the beginning of the new millennium, drawing on
these and other data,8 and informed by the theoretical scholarship of
colleagues in the legal academy.9  Section II discusses varieties of
large-scale litigation and presents some data on usage patterns.  Sec-
tion III discusses litigation practices in damage class actions.  Section
IV discusses litigation against tobacco and gun manufacturers and
health care organizations, litigation partially intended to change pub-
lic policies in the relevant domains.  Section V closes with some
comments on likely future trends.
II.  ONE MONSTER, OR MANY?
The term “class action” is sometimes treated as if it were syn-
onymous with “large scale litigation” or “mass torts.”  By “large scale
litigation,” I mean litigation comprising large numbers of like
claims—hundreds, thousands, tens of thousands, or even more—pur-
sued more or less collectively in what this conference’s organizers
have termed “group litigation.”10  By “mass torts,” I mean large-scale
8. There is considerable empirical literature on class actions and a goodly number of case
study investigations of mass torts.  See, e.g., THOMAS WILLGING ET AL., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (1996); Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study
of Settlement in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991); PETER H. SCHUCK,
AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (1987); RICHARD B.
SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY (1991); Jo-
seph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 301 (1992); MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE
CHALLENGES OF MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION (1996).  The extensive empirical lit-
erature on class actions published in the 1970s and 1980s is reviewed in CLASS ACTION
DILEMMAS, supra note 4, at ch. 2.
9. There is a vast theoretical literature on class actions, and a somewhat sparser theoreti-
cal literature on mass torts. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Liti-
gation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877
(1987); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 669 (1986); John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of
the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215 (1983); Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:
Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991); David Ro-
senberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort
System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851 (1994). For a judge’s view of issues posed by aggregating mass
tort claims, see JACK WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE
EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES (1995).
10. I exclude, for example, automobile accident claims, tens of thousands of which are filed
annually in the United States, but most of which pertain to widely dispersed plaintiffs and de-
fendants who are represented by large numbers of law firms acting independently of each other.
Because of the numbers of claims involved, virtually all large-scale litigation is “complex,” by
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personal injury or property damage litigation arising out of product
use or exposure.  In fact, in the United States, there are a variety of
devices for pursuing large-scale litigation other than the class action,
including multi-district litigation, formal consolidation, informal ag-
gregation, and bankruptcy.  Some of these devices have been estab-
lished by statute, some by court rule, and some are the products of
creative management by judges and lawyers.11  For policy-makers
considering calls for class action reform and for scholars seeking to
contribute to the policy debate, it is important to understand the
similarities as well as the differences among large-scale litigation,
mass torts, and class actions.  It is also useful to understand how
plaintiffs, defendants, and judges have used these procedures.
A. Class Actions
Class actions permit one or more persons to bring a civil lawsuit
on behalf of a large number of similarly situated people or entities.
The resolution of the lawsuit, by trial or settlement, binds all mem-
bers of the class, present and absent.  In U.S. damage class actions
(i.e., suits for money damages), class members who do not want to be
bound by the outcome must be given an opportunity to opt out, so
that they can pursue their claims individually if they so wish.12
Traditionally, class actions were understood to be representative
litigation, pursued on behalf of absent parties.  So, for example, a
typical damage class action might arise when representative plaintiffs
allege that a defendant acting illegally has imposed small losses on a
large number of people or entities.  No single individual would find it
worthwhile to pursue a lawsuit independently, nor would someone
wishing to act independently find it easy to obtain legal representa-
tion.  But collectively, class members can—if the suit is successful—
force the defendant to disgorge its ill-gotten gains.  Hence, many see
comparison with ordinary money damage litigation.  Not all complex litigation, however, is
large-scale—viz. antitrust litigation against Microsoft.
11. With the exception of bankruptcy, which is a creature of federal law, there are both
federal and state versions of each of these devices.  The state versions differ somewhat from
each other, but most are modeled after the federal devices, so it is convenient to focus on the
latter.
12. The opt-out provision applies to Rule 23(b)(3) class actions. Class actions under Rule
23(b)(1) and (b)(2) do not require notice to class members and opportunity to opt out. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 23(b).
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class actions as a powerful regulatory enforcement tool and view
those who bring them as “private attorneys general.”13
Much of the recent controversy in the United States over class
actions pertains to the use of class actions to resolve mass torts.
These class actions differ from traditional representative litigation in
that many class members have obtained individual legal representa-
tion and filed their own lawsuits prior to class certification.  Mass tort
class actions that are amalgams of individual claims and claims on be-
half of absent parties pose particularly intense conflict of interest
problems.14  The focus on mass tort class actions in recent U.S. schol-
arly and public policy debate may suggest to some that the availability
of a class action device was a prerequisite for mass tort litigation.
However, mass torts arose in the United States in an era when class
certification generally was not deemed appropriate for such litiga-
tion.15  According to a study conducted by Fred Misko,16 from 1966 to
1997, the U.S. Supreme Court decided fifty-five cases in which class
actions had been certified; just one of these pertained to a mass tort
action.  Less than ten percent of class action lawsuits decided by the
U.S. Circuit Courts from 1990-1997 involved mass tort litigation.17
The single mass tort class action decided by the U.S. Supreme Court
through 1997 was Amchem v. Windsor,18 the asbestos “futures” class
action settlement.  Asbestos personal injury and property damage
suits accounted for fourteen of the forty circuit court mass tort opin-
ions.19
13. This view of damage class actions has been sharply disputed in the United States in re-
cent years.  However, the historical record provides ample support for this view, as well as evi-
dence of contrary perceptions.  For an overview of the historical trends, see CLASS ACTION
DILEMMAS, supra note 4, at 71-73.
14. For discussion of the special problems of mass tort class actions, see Judith Resnik et
al., Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV.
296 (1996); see also Susan Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Geogine v. Amchem Prod-
ucts, Inc., 90 CORN. L. REV. 1045 (1995).
15. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 7, at 1056-57.
16. See FRED MISKO, MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION: CLASS ACTIONS & MASS
TORTS, (Law Office of Fred Misko, Jr.) (3rd ed., 1997) (from which the following data are cal-
culated).
17. See id.
18. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).  A second asbestos class action decision was handed down in 1999.
See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
19. Some of these opinions dealt with the same underlying case.  For example, of the nine
mass tort class action opinions handed down by the Third Circuit, five pertained to a single suit
in which school districts sought compensation for property damage, and two pertained to the
case that was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in Amchem.
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Despite concerns about the growth of class actions in the United
States, no one knows how many such lawsuits are filed annually or
are currently pending.20  In 1995-1996, RAND analysts identified
about 1000 reported judicial decisions pertaining to unique class ac-
tions.  Most of these pertained to cases that had been in litigation for
several or more years.  Because many lawsuits do not result in re-
ported decisions, RAND also searched other electronic databases for
indications of class action activity.  RAND found about 3200 refer-
ences to unique class actions in a database comprising general print
media, and identified about 300 cases from a business media data-
base.  Some of these reports pertained to newly filed lawsuits, some to
key decisions in pending litigation, and some to case verdicts or set-
tlements.21  The analysts estimated that about half of the litigation ac-
tivity was taking place in state courts.22  To provide an interpretative
context for these numbers, about 15.5 million civil lawsuits were filed
in state and federal courts in the United States in 1998.23
Although the actual number of class action lawsuits is almost cer-
tainly very small relative to the total civil caseload, most of the civil
cases include only one or a few claimants, while many class action
lawsuits involve thousands or even millions of class members.
Moreover, based on data provided by lawyers and parties, RAND
analysts concluded that the number of class action lawsuits likely
surged during the 1990s, partially explaining the growing controversy
over class litigation.
20. At least through the mid-1990s, administrative reports of class actions in the federal
courts omitted a significant number of lawsuits.  See WILLGING ET AL., supra note 8.  State
courts do not routinely report the number or progress of class actions.  See CLASS ACTION
DILEMMAS, supra note 4, at ch. 3 and App. B.
21. Some of the latter include cases resulting in reported decisions.  Because the method of
constructing the databases RAND searched differed, the analysts felt it was not appropriate to
combine estimates from different sources.  See CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS, supra note 4, at ch.3
and App. B.
22. See CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS, supra note 4, at ch. 3.  A somewhat different distribu-
tion of case types was found by the Federal Judicial Center in its study of class action lawsuits
terminated in 1992-1994 in four federal district courts.  See WILLGING ET AL., supra note 8.
RAND suggested that the difference is attributable to the inclusion of state litigation in its
analysis, which appears to include a greater proportion of consumer class actions.  See CLASS
ACTION DILEMMAS, supra note 4, at App. B.
23. Statistics come from the Court Statistics Project, available at the National Center for
State Courts website at <http://www.ncsc.dni.us>.  For state courts, these figures include filings
in limited jurisdiction courts, including small claims. In comparison, in the late 1980s, I esti-
mated based on then-available data from state and federal courts that about 2.5 million tort and
contract suits were filed annually in the United States. See Deborah Hensler, Reading the Tort
Litigation Tea-Leaves, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 139 (1993).
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RAND analysts estimated that traditional representative actions,
such as securities cases and consumer cases (i.e., suits alleging finan-
cial loss as a result of deceptive advertising, unfair business practices,
and the like) accounted for about half of class action litigation during
the mid-1990s.  Another fifteen percent of cases were brought by em-
ployees claiming violations of their rights.  Other civil rights lawsuits,
suits for government benefits, taxpayer suits, and other suits against
the government accounted for another twenty to twenty-five percent
of class litigation.  RAND analysts estimated that somewhere be-
tween nine and eighteen percent of all class actions ongoing in 1995-
1996 arose out of allegations of personal injury or property damage
resulting from product use or exposure.24  (See Figure 1.)
FIGURE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF CLASS ACTION ACTIVITY, BY TYPE (1995-1996)
B. Multi-district Litigation
A common feature of large-scale litigation in the United States is
that it is dispersed across multiple federal and state courts.  Multi-
districting is a statutory-based procedure25 that allows parties to re-
24. See CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS, supra note 4, at ch. 3.
25. See 28 U.S.C. §1407 (2000).
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quest that the judiciary collect lawsuits arising out of the same or
similar circumstances that have been filed in different federal district
courts and transfer them to a single court and judge for purposes of
pretrial preparation.26  (In some instances, the transferred cases may
include multiple competing class actions that were filed in different
federal jurisdictions.)  Under the statute, if the cases are not resolved
during their pendency in the transferee court, they must be sent back
to the court in which they were originally filed for trial.27  However,
collecting and transferring like claims to a single judge often encour-
ages settlement of these claims, which may be the real goal of the par-
ties requesting multi-districting.  Transferring all pending federal
claims to a single judge may also provide an occasion for that judge to
certify a class action, encompassing not only the transferred claims
but those filed in state courts and those of absent parties as well.
Lawyers, parties, and judges may all cooperate to facilitate such
“global” resolutions.
Since its inception in 1968, the Judicial Panel on Multi-district
Litigation (JPMDL) has decided about 1300 motions for transfer.
About 20% of the motions related to securities cases and about 15%
to antitrust litigation.28  About 10% of them related to mass torts, or
mass product defect cases and cases arising out of catastrophic acci-
dents.29  The panel granted Multi-district Litigation transfer status to
about two-thirds of all the motions it considered, and to a somewhat
smaller fraction—59%—of the motions in mass torts.
The total number of motions considered by the panel rose sig-
nificantly over time, from 379 in the 1970s to 473 in the 1990s (an in-
crease of about 25%).  The number of motions in mass tort cases in-
creased by fully 100%.  Across the decades, the proportion of total
26. The Judicial Panel on Multi-districting, appointed by the Chief Justice, has the power
to grant MDL status and selects the judge to whom the cases will be transferred.  The Panel may
consider granting MDL status sua sponte, but usually acts in response to party requests.
27. See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg, et. al., 523 U.S. 26 (1998) (describing the application of
§1407’s provision for Multi-district Litigation).
28. Another 159 motions were withdrawn or the Panel declined to decide them because
they had become moot.  Note that each motion represents multiple lawsuits, since the prerequi-
site for collection and transfer of cases is the pendency of multiple cases.  Some of the 1300 de-
cided motions related to the same underlying litigation.  For example, motions to transfer asbes-
tos worker injury suits were twice denied by the Panel before it granted MDL status to federal
asbestos personal injury lawsuits in 1991.  MDL docket data were provided by the Clerk of the
Panel.  I am responsible for the tabulations and statistics presented here.
29. Another eleven percent related to litigation arising from air disasters.  Generally in the
United States, wrongful death cases arising out of air crashes are litigated by a highly specialized
bar that overlaps only somewhat with the mass tort bar.
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motions granted held steady.  However, the proportion of motions
granted in mass torts varied dramatically, even after taking into ac-
count the small numbers of pertinent motions.  During the 1990s, the
Panel granted almost three-quarters of the motions for transfer in
mass torts that came before it.  (See Table 1.)
TABLE 1
MDL ACTIONS, ALL CASES AND MASS TORTS ONLY
1968-69 1978-79 1980-89 1990-99
All Case Types
Total Motions 30 379 389 473
Number Granted 26 251 218 313
% Granted 87 66 56 66
Mass Torts*
Total Motions 1 28 50 59
Number Granted 1 16 22 42
% Granted 100 57 44 71
* Includes mass product defect and catastrophic accident cases.  Does not include aviation
accident cases.
C. Consolidated Trials, Bankruptcy and Informal Aggregation
In mass tort litigation, lawyers frequently file multiple individual
claims arising out of similar circumstances against one or a few de-
fendants in a single court.  That court may decide to assign all of these
claims to a single judge.  Then the judge may issue discovery and
other orders that apply to all of the cases, and may schedule groups of
like cases for settlement discussions, thereby streamlining case proc-
essing.
A judge who has multiple matters involving common questions
of law and fact pending before her may consolidate them for trial.30
Unlike the trial of a class action lawsuit, the outcome of a consoli-
30. See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a).  Normally, judges would consolidate a few cases under the
rule, but some judges presiding over mass tort claims have consolidated hundreds or thousands
of claims. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 7; Jumbo Consolidation in Asbestos Litigation:
Hearing on H.R. 1283, The Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act, Before the House Comm. on
the Judiciary (July 1, 1999) (prepared statement of William Eskridge).
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dated trial applies only to the claims that were tried, not to absent
parties.  However, a single consolidated trial may have important in-
direct effects on the course of litigation.  By demonstrating the risk
attendant in trial, the verdict influences the settlement value of other
pending and future claims.  A very large award may diminish the
likelihood that other plaintiffs whose cases are further back in the
queue will be able to obtain compensation for their losses.  At the ex-
treme, a huge verdict in a “mega-trial” could result in the bankruptcy
of a defendant.  To my knowledge, no one has yet assembled system-
atic information on the number of consolidated trials in large-scale
litigation in the United States.
Tort claims against a defendant that has sought the protection of
the bankruptcy courts may be liquidated by establishing a trust that
will pay claimants who meet eligibility requirements by distributing
amounts according to an agreed-upon schedule of damages.  Some-
times, only those tort-creditors who have filed an eligibility statement
before a date set by the court can collect from the trust; in other in-
stances, claimants can come forward far into the future.  More than a
dozen corporations have sought the protection of the bankruptcy
courts in asbestos litigation.31  Other mass torts that have ended in the
bankruptcy courts include litigation arising out of the use of the Dal-
kon Shield32 and silicone breast implants.
Formal aggregation, bringing with it the disclosure of alleged
harm to large numbers of people, the potential for dramatic trial ver-
dicts, the likelihood that large amounts of money will change hands,
and the possibility of bankruptcy, frequently attracts the attention of
print and broadcast media.  But in the background of large-scale liti-
gation, there may be considerable informal aggregation.  In mature
mass torts,33 where there may be a widely-shared understanding of the
value of certain types of claims, thousands of lesser-value claims may
be resolved en masse according to negotiated schedules of damages
that pay little attention to individual claim differences and involve lit-
tle adversarial litigation.
31. See Deborah Hensler, Fashioning a Resolution of Asbestos Personal Injury Litigation:
A Reply to Professor Brickman, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1967, n.23 (1992).
32. See SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW, supra note 8, at 47.
33. See Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 BOSTON. U. L.
REV. 659, 688-94 (1989).
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D. Similarities and Differences Among Procedures
All of the devices just discussed provide means of aggregating
large numbers of like claims, thereby allowing parties, lawyers, and
judges to deal with large-scale litigation more efficiently.  However,
they also impose a variety of costs on plaintiffs and defendants.  Im-
portantly, for those concerned with class action reform, some of the
costs attributed to class actions are also inherent in other forms of
large-scale litigation.
For plaintiffs, aggregation—however it is accomplished—reduces
opportunities for individualized process and custom-crafted out-
comes.  Plaintiffs are rarely present at the bargaining tables when ag-
gregate settlements are negotiated:34 lawyers who are settling large
numbers of claims at a time are usually attracted to quasi-
administrative schemes that do not require significant time or re-
sources to determine damage payments.35  By comparison with indi-
vidual litigation, however, aggregate settlements and administrative
compensation schemes may speed payments to plaintiffs.  Some
claimants may be able to obtain compensation even without legal rep-
resentation.  But aggregate settlements are not reached overnight,
and many plaintiffs may believe that they need lawyers to help them
negotiate administrative compensation processes.  Lawyers who rep-
resent individual claimants may charge these claimants full freight,
notwithstanding any economies of scale that the lawyers may realize
as a result of aggregation.  Aggregation may also lead to higher
claiming rates,36 meaning that larger numbers of plaintiffs come for-
ward to obtain compensation.  The value of individual claims may
diminish, in turn, as the available funds must be shared with more
people.  Rather than claim values being reduced proportionately,
stronger claims may be reduced more in order to satisfy the demands
of a larger-than-anticipated claimant population.  Finally, aggregation
exacerbates the agency problems that are inherent in litigation.
Plaintiffs have little control over their lawyer-agents.  Many plaintiffs
with conflicting interests may be represented by a single lawyer, who
34. See Deborah Hensler, A Glass Half Full, A Glass Half Empty? The Use of Alternative
Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1587, 1606 (1995).
35. See Frances E. McGovern, The Alabama DDT Settlement Fund, 53 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 61 (1990) (discussing claims resolution facilities and the mass settlement of mass torts).
36. About 300,000 claims were filed in response to the bankruptcy notice in the Dalkon
Shield litigation, of which about 195,000 were subsequently judged valid.  See SOBOL, BENDING
THE LAW, supra note 8.  More than 400,000 breast implant claimants came forward in response
to the notice of a tentative class action settlement.  See MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL:
THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE 22 (1997).
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may find it attractive to compromise one client’s claim in order to ob-
tain payment for another’s.  Some lawyers may find it attractive to
settle a large block of claims for less than full value and with a sub-
stantial fee, thereby freeing themselves to move on to the next set of
cases.  Even though they might be able to achieve a more generous
settlement and higher fees for the first set of cases by investing addi-
tional time and resources in them, spreading their time and resources
more broadly may yield more lucrative fees on their entire portfolio.
For defendants, aggregation should reduce transaction costs by
comparison with litigating claims individually.  Higher claiming rates,
however, are likely to increase the total price of settlement beyond
what it might have been if all the claims necessitated individual litiga-
tion.  With larger amounts of money at stake, plaintiff attorneys may
litigate more aggressively, leading to higher defense fees and ex-
penses, and thereby eroding the transaction cost savings accrued from
aggregation.  Plaintiffs’ access to jury trial and the availability of puni-
tive damages are key factors in estimating the stakes.  Even when li-
ability is highly uncertain, the huge exposure associated with group
trials of large numbers of claims enhances the settlement value of the
claims.  If the cases are tried, the potential for large verdicts against
corporate defendants may drive stock prices lower.  Conversely, by
reducing or eliminating uncertainty about future exposure and re-
ducing anticipated legal expenses, aggregate settlements may improve
corporate defendants’ stock market position.  Defendants’ interests in
reducing their risk exposure may drive up the settlement value of
large-scale litigation even further.
The extent to which plaintiffs and defendants realize the benefits
and costs of aggregation may differ by procedure.  For example, class
action rules require notifying plaintiffs of the pendency of litigation,
providing them an opportunity to opt out and allowing them to par-
ticipate in a court proceeding to voice their opinion of a proposed set-
tlement.  Tort creditors must vote on proposed bankruptcy agree-
ments, including compensation plans.  Such rules may mitigate
somewhat the impairment of due process that derives from aggrega-
tion.  Plaintiffs whose cases are tried together in a consolidated pro-
ceeding may be able to attend the trial.  In contrast, there is no rule
that requires plaintiff attorneys to inform their clients that they are
litigating large numbers of individual claims en masse—information
which might alert the clients that they need to pay special attention to
the course of the litigation and the settlements that are being negoti-
ated.  Similarly, class action rules require judges to review and ap-
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prove settlements, providing some protection against agency prob-
lems.  Judges must also approve bankruptcy agreements.  However,
judges have no formal authority to review or deny approval of party-
negotiated settlements in other aggregate contexts.37  Under the
common fund doctrine, judges award fees to class counsel, providing
a potential barrier to collusion and self-dealing.38  Judges do not play
any role in setting fees in informally aggregated cases.  Informal ag-
gregation reduces the risk exposure of defendants by comparison with
class actions and consolidated trials; unless the cases are formally
consolidated, they cannot be tried jointly.  The outcomes of non-class
litigation do not directly affect the rights and remedies of absent par-
ties; only class actions and bankruptcy have the potential to yield a
truly global resolution of mass litigation.39  (Figure 2 summarizes
some of the key differences among procedures for plaintiffs and de-
fendants.)
FIGURE 2
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37. For a description of judicial responses to the challenges of aggregation, see WEINSTEIN,
supra note 9.
38. See Judith Resnik et al., supra note 14, at 337.
39. Whether defendants can realize that potential is highly uncertain, in the wake of recent
U.S. Supreme Court decisions rejecting class action settlements in two asbestos cases.  See
Amchem v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
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In practice, differences among procedures may be blurred as a
result of differences in implementation.  For example, a pro forma re-
view and approval of a class action settlement may afford little more
protection against agency problems than is accorded by an informal
aggregation process that does not require judicial scrutiny of a party-
negotiated settlement.  Formal differences among procedures also
may have less import in practice because a single litigation may in-
volve multiple procedures, skillfully manipulated by the parties to
achieve desired aims.  Figure 3 presents summary data on the proce-
dural course of selected mass torts, drawing on information collected
by the Federal Judicial Center40 and RAND.  Although these data are
not comprehensive, they do suggest that large-scale litigation at the
end of the twentieth century in the United States was characterized
by procedural variety.  Whether any of these procedures is more
“monstrous” than any other and whether the “monster” is large-scale,
collective litigation, however it is pursued, are important questions
for policy-makers.  Without careful consideration of these questions,
procedural reformers run the risk of slaying one monster, only to find
that they are faced with others whose behavior may be more trou-
bling.
40. The FJC data are drawn from Thomas Willging et al., Individual Characteristics of Mass
Torts Case Congregations: A Report to the Mass Torts Working Group, in Report of the Advi-
sory Committee on Civil Rules and the Working Group on Mass Torts at App. D, iii-iv (Judicial
Conference of the United States Working Group on Mass Torts) (1999). The RAND data are
drawn from Hensler & Peterson, supra note 7, and from additional research for a project on
mass torts that I am currently conducting.
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FIGURE 3
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NOTES to Figure 3:
1. Number of Claimants: Properly describing the size of a mass tort is subject to debate. In
some instances, millions of people have used or been exposed to the allegedly injurious
product.  Some global settlement agreements reflect estimates of such exposure, even though
far fewer claimants may come forward ultimately.  The figures here represent best estimates
of the numbers of claimants (not lawsuits) anticipated, given the current posture of the litiga-
tion.  In some instances, these figures are different from estimates made earlier in the litiga-
tion.  Most numbers are rough approximations, rather than precise estimates.
2. Dates: Decade when the litigation grew into a mass tort.  In some instances, individual suits
were pursued in prior decades.  Such suits often had mixed success.
3. Procedure: Multi-district litigation (“MDL”) is indicated if a motion for collection and trans-
fer was made; the subsequent column is checked when the motion was granted.  Class action
activity is indicated when the record shows that there were attempts by some parties to pro-
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ceed in class form.  The subsequent column is checked when a class action was certified.  In
many instances, some lawsuits were certified (and settled) as class actions, while others pro-
ceeded outside the class context.
KEY: “P”=Partial resolution by this mean; “T”=Tentative resolution not yet finalized;
“O”=awaiting decision.
SOURCES: WILLGING ET AL., MASS TORT LITIGATION REPORT, supra note 40, at App. D;
Hensler & Peterson, supra note 7; and data from Author’s ongoing study of mass torts.
III.  THE NATURE OF THE BEAST
Consideration of the characteristics of large-scale litigation is
limited by the fact that we know more about some types of litigation
than others.  In the United States, class actions have garnered the at-
tention of academic theorists and empiricists, as well as policy mak-
ers.41  As a result, we have much more information about litigation
practices in class actions than, for example, in multi-district litigation42
or informal aggregation.
For our study of contemporary litigation practices in damage
class actions, my RAND colleagues and I interviewed practitioners on
both the plaintiff and defense sides of the litigation.  We also con-
ducted case studies43 of ten recently resolved class action lawsuits, six
of which arose out of consumer transactions and four of which were
mass tort class actions.44  The ten case studies provided a concrete ba-
sis for considering the claims that are central to the current U.S. con-
troversy over damage class actions.  In brief, critics claim the follow-
ing:
1. Damage class actions are solely the creatures of class action
attorneys’ entrepreneurial incentives.
41. See supra notes 8 and 9.
42. For example, I have been able to find only one empirical analysis of multi-district litiga-
tion and one scholarly treatment of consolidated trials.  See Susan M. Olson, Federal Multidis-
trict Litigation: Its Impact on Litigants, 13 JUST. SYS. J. 341 (1988-89) (for an empirical analysis).
See Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69
(1989) (for a scholarly treatment).
43. Case study research calls for selecting a few examples of a phenomenon of interest and
then intensively investigating the characteristics of those examples (‘cases’). By closely examin-
ing a relatively small number of cases and comparing and contrasting them, the researcher
learns about the significant features of the phenomenon and how it varies under different cir-
cumstances. Case study research is particularly well suited to investigating processes.  See gener-
ally ROBERT YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGN AND METHODS (2d ed. 1994).
44. For a description of the case study methodology, including criteria for case selection,
see CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS, supra note 4, at ch. 4 and App. D. Five of these cases were set-
tled in federal court, and the other half were settled in state court. In 6 of the 10 cases, either the
settling lawyers or other lawyers filed similar class action lawsuits in other jurisdictions.
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2. It is easy to detect non-meritorious class actions—and most
suits are non-meritorious.
3. The benefits of class actions accrue primarily to the lawyers
who bring them.
4. Transaction costs far outweigh benefits to the class and soci-
ety.
5. Existing rules are not adequate to insure that class actions
serve their public goals.
This section summarizes the findings from the RAND case stud-
ies pertinent to these claims.45  The findings paint a more complex and
more nuanced picture of damage class actions than generally is found
in media reports, political commentary, and scholarly writing.  Dam-
age class actions are clearly powerful beasts.  While they may appear
to be “monsters” to those who must defend themselves against them,
they seem more like stalwart—although sometimes wayward—pro-
tectors to consumer advocates and public interest attorneys.  Whether
the powers of the “monsters” are directed at doing social good rather
than harm depends substantially on how well judges control the litiga-
tion process.  In U.S. courts today, it appears as though wrestling with
the monster is more than some judges are willing to take on.
A. Class Actions Are the Products of Multiple Actors
The image of class action lawyers as “bounty hunters” pervades
the debate over damage class actions.  Without greedy lawyers to
search them out, the argument goes, there would be few, if any, such
lawsuits.  The RAND case studies tell a more textured tale of how
damage class actions arise and obtain certification.
In the ten lawsuits my colleagues and I studied closely, class ac-
tion lawyers played myriad roles.  Some class actions arose after ex-
tensive individual litigation or efforts to deal with consumer com-
plaints outside the courts; others were the first and only form of
litigation resulting from a perceived problem.  Sometimes class action
lawyers uncovered an allegedly illegal practice on their own.  Some-
times angry consumers (or their lawyers) contacted the class action
lawyers.  Sometimes the class action lawyers first found out about a
potential case from regulators or the media.  Sometimes they jumped
onto a litigation bandwagon that had been constructed by other class
action lawyers.  When they came later to the process, class action at-
45. For details of the case study findings, see CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS, supra note 4, at
chs. 5-14.
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torneys sometimes brought resources and expertise that helped con-
clude the case successfully for the class, though sometimes they
seemingly arrived simply to claim a share of the spoils.
Defendants’ responses to the class actions varied from case to
case. In seven of the ten cases, they opposed class litigation vigor-
ously, not only seeking to have the case dismissed on substantive legal
grounds but also contesting certification, sometimes all the way up to
the highest appellate courts.  Once they lost the initial battle(s) over
certification, however, these defendants joined with plaintiff attor-
neys in pursuing certification of a settlement class.  In the remaining
three cases, from the moment of filing, defendants seemed about as
eager as plaintiff attorneys to settle the litigation by means of a class
action, often after extensive individual litigation, previous class ac-
tions, or both.  Once defendants decided to support class action
treatment of the litigation, they (not surprisingly) favored as broad a
definition of the class as possible.  Some defendants also sought to
bind class members definitively, by seeking certification of non-opt-
out classes or subclasses.
B. It Is Often Difficult to Judge the Merits of Damage Class Actions
A central theme of the current controversy over damage class ac-
tions in the United States is that a large fraction of such lawsuits are
non-meritorious because the alleged damages to class members are
“trivial,” “technical,” or just plain make-believe.  In its recent effort
to reform the class action rule, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee
devoted considerable energy to attempting to frame rule revisions
that would screen out such cases.46
In the policy debate, questions about lawsuits’ merits, which per-
tain to the facts and law, are often confused with criticism of their
outcomes, which are a product of the incentives that drive settlement
as well as the merits of the underlying claims.  In the RAND case
studies, to assess the seriousness of the claims underlying the class ac-
tions, we looked at the claims themselves and the allegations that par-
ties made about practices and products, rather than at the way the
claims were settled.
Although many of these class action lawsuits were vigorously
contested, at the time of settlement there was still considerable uncer-
tainty about defendants’ culpability and plaintiff class members’ dam-
46. For a discussion of the recent reform efforts, see CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS, supra
note 4, at ch. 2.
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ages.  To the RAND research team, it was unclear which, if any, of
the ten class actions were non-meritorious and which were worthy of
litigation.  In each lawsuit, viewed from one perspective, the claims
appeared meritorious and the behavior of the defendant blamewor-
thy; viewed from another perspective, the claims appeared trivial or
even trumped up, and the defendant’s behavior seemed proper.
Moreover, we have found that different readers’ assessments of the
merits of the cases often are diametrically opposed.
Among the ten class actions, the alleged losses to individuals
varied enormously.  Among consumer suits, the alleged individual
dollar losses ranged from an average of $3.83 to an average of $4550;
in five of the six cases the average was probably less than $1000. 47  It
is highly unlikely that any individual claiming such losses would find
legal representation without incurring significant personal expense.
By comparison with the consumer cases, the individual losses alleged
in the mass tort class actions varied more in character and quantity,
ranging from losses of less than $5000, to allegations of death in one
of the mass personal injury lawsuits.  In the latter case, had plaintiff
attorneys been confident that they could prevail on liability, individu-
als would have been able to secure legal representation on a contin-
gency-fee basis.  In cases like the other three mass tort class actions,
however, where losses were comparatively small, securing individual
legal representation on a contingency-fee basis would have been
more problematic unless plaintiff attorneys were prepared to pursue
individual claims in a mass, but non-class, litigation.48
The defendants’ practices that led to the consumer class actions
ranged from modest overcharges on individual transactions to sales
practices that were allegedly calculated to deceive.  Depending on
how one told the story of what defendants did, they appeared more or
less culpable.  Whether defendants’ practices violated applicable stat-
utes, regulations, and case law was the most contentious issue in the
consumer class actions we studied—an issue that was never fully re-
solved because none of these cases went to trial.
Three of the mass tort class actions alleged manufacturing de-
fects, and the fourth concerned disposal of toxic factory waste prod-
ucts.  In three of the four mass tort class actions my colleagues and I
studied, defendants did not contest plaintiffs’ assertions that the
products involved were defective, although defendants did contest
47. Information on losses was not available in all cases.
48. In one instance, thousands of claims had, in fact, been informally aggregated. The law-
yers who represented clients in this litigation opposed class certification.
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their liability for these defects.  The battles over scientific evidence
that have characterized many high-profile mass tort class actions—
battles that go to the heart of the question of their merit—were
largely absent from these cases.  However, had one of the mass
personal injury class actions reached trial, the question of scientific
causation would have been key to the outcome.
C. Assessing  Benefits and Costs Is Also Difficult
The notion that class action attorneys are the prime beneficiaries
of damage class actions is widespread.  Tales abound of lawsuits in
which class members receive checks for a few dollars—or even a few
cents—while lawyers reap millions in fees.  The “aroma of gross profi-
teering”49 that many perceive rising from damage class actions trou-
bles even those who support continuance of damage class actions and
fuels the controversy over them.
Among the damage class actions my RAND colleagues and I
studied, we found enormous variety in the amounts of money that
class members received and in the suits’ non-monetary consequences.
Class action attorneys received substantial fees in all of the suits, but
both the amount of their fees and their share of the monetary funds
created as a result of the settlements varied dramatically.
The wide range of outcomes that we found in the lawsuits con-
tradicts the view that damage class actions invariably produce little
for class members, and that class action attorneys routinely garner the
lion’s share of settlements.  But what we learned about the process of
reaching these outcomes suggests that class counsel were sometimes
simply interested in finding a settlement price that defendants would
agree to—rather than in finding out what class members had lost,
what defendants had gained, and how likely it was that defendants
would actually be held liable if the suit were to go to trial, and negoti-
ating a fair settlement based on the answers to these questions.
Moreover, among the class actions we studied, some settlements ap-
peared at first reading to provide more for class members and con-
sumers than they actually did, and class action attorneys’ financial
rewards sometimes were based on the settlements’ apparent value
rather than on the real outcomes of the cases.
49. John Frank, a member of the 1966 Civil Rules Advisory Committee that drafted Rule
23(b)(3) has written: “The great big question [about damage class actions] is whether the social
utility of the large class action outweighs the limited benefits to individuals, the aroma of gross
profiteering, and the transactional costs to the court system.” Whither Rule 23: Memorandum to
the Honorable Patrick Higgenbotham (Apr. 28, 1995) (on file with the Advisory Committee).
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In one of the ten class actions, there was no public record of the
total amount the defendant had agreed to pay class members, al-
though there was a record of the attorney fee award.  In the nine re-
maining cases, the total compensation defendants offered class mem-
bers ranged from just under $1 million to more than $800 million.
One of these cases included a substantial “coupon” component; de-
pending on how one valued these coupons, the settlement was worth
close to $70 million, or just about $35 million.
When reviewing class action settlements, judges must consider
whether they are “fair, adequate and reasonable.”50  Comparing a
proposed settlement amount to the estimated class losses provides
one basis for such an assessment.  However, in seven of the ten class
actions we studied, the attorneys never offered a public estimate of
these losses.
In three cases, by the time of the RAND study, class members
had claimed all or almost all of the money set aside for compensation.
In three other cases, it appeared that all or almost all of the funds
committed by the defendants for class compensation would ultimately
be claimed.  However, in another three cases, class members claimed
one-third or less of the funds set aside for compensation.51  In the re-
maining case, although the total compensation made available to the
class was not reported to the court, we believe that less than half of
the settlement was claimed.
The total amount of compensation dollars collected or projected
to be collected by class members in the cases RAND studied ranged
from about $270 thousand to about $840 million.  Average payments
to individual class members ranged from about $6.00 to $1500 in con-
sumer suits, and from about $6400 to $100,000 in mass tort suits.  (See
Table 2)
50. Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir. 1977); Grunin v. Int’l House of Pan-
cakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir. 1975).
51. In one of these cases, our calculation is based on estimates from public financial data
rather than courts records, as the judge did not require the parties to report disbursement in-
formation to him.
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TABLE 2
TOTAL COMPENSATION OFFERED AND COLLECTED BY
CLASS MEMBERS, AND AVERAGE CASH PAYMENTS
Total Amount
Defendants


















Pinney v. Great Western
Bank
$11.232 $11.232 $1478.89











In re Factor VIII or IX
Blood Products
$650.000 $620.0003 $100,000.00




Cox et al. v. Shell et al. $838.000 $838.0003 $1433.294
NOTES:
1 Estimated from financial reports and other documents.
2 Information not from public records.
3 Projected.
4 to June 1998.
In all six consumer cases, the litigation was associated with
changes in the defendants’ business practices.  In four of the six cases,
the evidence strongly suggests that the litigation, directly or indi-
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rectly, produced the changes in practice.  In the two other lawsuits,
the evidence on whether the instant class action led to the change is
more ambiguous.  Three of the consumer cases also led to changes in
state consumer law, although in one case, the revision was arguably
pro-business.  In three of the mass tort cases, the class litigation fol-
lowed removal of the product from the market or change in the prod-
uct.  In the fourth, the manufacturer changed the product (which is
still marketed) after state attorneys general investigations and litiga-
tion commenced.
Awards to class action attorneys for fees and expenses ranged
from about half a million dollars to $75 million.52  Under law, judges
award class counsel fees, calculated either as a share of the total
monetary value of the settlement, or by adding hours, assigning an
hourly rate (sometimes adjusted by a factor to reflect the quality of
the work) and adding in expenses.53  In practice, the total monetary
value of the settlement generally is defined as including money made
available for compensation to class members, payments to other
beneficiaries, and all of the costs required to administer the settle-
ment.  In all ten of the RAND case studies, judges used the percent-
age-of-fund (“POF”) method.  In the nine cases for which we know
both the total amount of the settlement and the total amount
awarded or set aside for class counsel, class counsel fee-and-expense
awards ranged from five percent to about fifty percent of the total set-
tlement value.  In eight of the nine cases, class counsel received one-
third or less of the total settlement value.54
In damage class actions, not all class members come forward to
claim the full amount defendants make available for compensation.
The actual value of a settlement is determined by the amount that is
ultimately claimed by class members, which is determined by how
many class members come forward, and sometimes by their eligibility
for differing levels of payment.  Class counsel received one-third or
less of the actual settlement value in six of the ten cases RAND stud-
52. We could not obtain data on how much defense attorneys earned from these lawsuits
because these fees were not a matter of public record and most defendants were unwilling to
share the information with us.
53. For a discussion of fee doctrine in common fund cases, see Resnik et al., supra note 38.
54. In the tenth case, it does not appear that the judge was provided with any means for
comparing the fee request with this benchmark, because there was no public estimate of the ag-
gregate common benefit.
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ied;55 in the remaining four cases, class counsel’s share of the actual
settlement value was about one-half.  In three of the mass tort cases,
class counsel were awarded less than ten percent of the actual settle-
ment value, but the absolute dollar amount was very large because
these settlements were huge.
Critics often use yet a third benchmark to assess plaintiff class ac-
tion attorney fees: the amount the attorneys are awarded, compared
to the amount class members receive.  Because class counsel are paid
for what they accomplish for the class as a whole, their fee awards will
almost certainly be greater than any individual class member’s award,
even in a mass tort class action where class members sometimes re-
ceive substantial settlements.  But in three of the cases we studied,
class counsel received more than class members received altogether.
(See Table 3)
55. Although we do not know the total negotiated settlement value in one case, the defen-
dant did share information with us on its actual value.  Hence, we can compute these shares for
all ten cases.
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TABLE 3
TOTAL AWARDED TO CLASS COUNSEL, COMPARED TO










Roberts v. Bausch & Lomb $8.500 $9.1752
Pinney v. Great Western Bank $5.223 $11.232
Graham v. Security Pacific Housing
Services, Inc.
$1.920 $7.583
Selnick v. Sacramento Cable $0.511 $0.271
Inman v. Heilig-Meyers $0.580 $0.2723
Martinez v. Allstate/Sendejo v. Farmers $11.288 $8.914
Mass Tort Class Actions
In re Factor VIII or IX Blood Products $36.5001 $620.0001
Atkins v. Harcros $24.900 $25.175
In re Louisiana-Pacific Siding Litigation $25.200 $470.0541
Cox et al. v. Shell et al. $75.000 $838.0001
NOTES:
1 Projected.
2 Estimated from financial reports and other documents.
3 Information not from public records.
D. Deciding Whether the Benefits Are Worth the Costs Requires a
Political Judgment
Class actions are costly.  My RAND colleagues and I estimated
that total costs in the ten cases we studied, excluding defendants’ own
legal expenses, ranged from about $1 million to over $1 billion.  Eight
of the ten cases cost more than $10 million; four of the ten cost more
than $50 million; three cost more than half a billion dollars.
Transaction costs in class action lawsuits include not only the
plaintiff class action attorneys’ and defense attorneys’ fees and ex-
penses, but also the costs of notice and settlement administration,
which can be substantial.  Because most defendants declined to share
data on their own legal expenses, my colleagues and I could not cal-
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culate a transaction cost ratio that took into account all dollars spent
on these lawsuits.  As a share of the total bill—excluding defendants’
legal fees and expenses but including plaintiff attorneys’ fees and ex-
penses and administrative costs—transaction costs were lowest in
three of the four mass tort class actions, and highest in the consumer
class actions.  But because mass tort cases are likely to impose large
defense costs, these differences may be illusory.  My colleagues and I
did not estimate the public costs associated with the cases we studied.
However, the Federal Judicial Center has estimated that damage class
actions take about five times as much judicial time as comparable
non-class suits.56
Determining whether the benefits of Rule 23 damage class ac-
tions outweigh their costs—even in only ten lawsuits—turned out to
be enormously difficult.  Whether the corporate behaviors that con-
sumer class actions sought to change were worth changing, whether
the dollars that plaintiff class action attorneys sought to obtain for
consumer class members were worth recouping, and whether the
changes in corporate behavior that were achieved and the amounts of
compensation consumers collected were significant are, to a consider-
able extent, matters of judgment.  Whether the damages claimed by
mass tort class members were legitimate, whether defendants should
have been held responsible for these damages, and whether plaintiffs
were better served by class litigation than they would have been by
individual litigation are also matters of judgment.
How one assesses the cost-benefit ratio of these class actions de-
pends in part on how one assesses the merits of the underlying claims,
the value of the settlements to class members, the deterrence value of
the litigation, and the democratic value of providing access to the jus-
tice system.  It also depends on one’s confidence in other institutions’
capacity to identify wrongdoing and to seek remedies for those who
are harmed and penalties for those who erred. Answering these ques-
tions ultimately requires political judgments.
E. The Rules in Practice Do Not Provide Sufficient Protection
Against the Self-Interests That Pervade Class Actions
In the United States, rules and case law set guidelines that are in-
tended to protect against the powerful incentives for self-dealing that
56. See WILLGING ET AL., supra note 8.
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inhere in representative litigation.57  The RAND case studies, as well
as the research teams’ interviews with class action lawyers, defen-
dants, public interest lawyers, judges, and others, persuaded my col-
leagues and me that these protective mechanisms too often fail. In the
ten class actions we studied, we found considerable variation in what
judges required of attorneys and parties.  From a societal perspective,
the balance of benefits and costs was more salutary when judges did
the following:
 required notifying class members about the purposes, prog-
ress, and likely outcomes of the litigation;
 closely scrutinized the details of proposals to resolve the liti-
gation by negotiated settlements;
 invited the participation of outsiders, who offered alternative
perspectives on settlement proposals;
 took responsibility for determining attorneys’ fees, so as to
preclude collusion between class attorneys and defendants;
 determined fees in relation to the actual benefits created by
the lawsuit to insure that class attorneys were not offered im-
proper incentives for bringing weak suits; and
 monitored the distribution of compensation funds post-
settlement.
However, exercising their authority to demand or carry out these
tasks requires substantial resources that are often not available to
judges and may also require managerial and extra-legal expertise that
is beyond the reach of some judges.  A nation or other jurisdiction
that chooses to provide a private litigation vehicle for achieving social
goals such as regulatory enforcement and mass compensation ought
not to venture into this territory unless it has both the means and the
will to invest the resources necessary to regulate the litigation.
IV.  NEW MONSTERS?
In the past few years, the spotlight of controversy over class ac-
tions in the United States has shifted from securities, consumer, and
mass tort class actions to large-scale litigation against tobacco manu-
facturers, gun manufacturers, and health care management and insur-
ance corporations (“managed care organizations”).  This new litiga-
tion comprises a mix of private personal injury claims pursued
collectively (that is, mass torts) and public actions brought by state at-
57. For a discussion of these rules and their practical applications, see CLASS ACTION
DILEMMAS, supra note 4, at ch. 3.
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torneys general and other public officials.  The public actions typically
seek reimbursement of government expenditures allegedly incurred
as a result of injuries due to the manufacturers’ practices.  Some of
these actions have proceeded individually, but some—such as the to-
bacco lawsuits by state attorneys general—have been litigated in a
coordinated fashion.  In addition to seeking monetary compensation
for individuals and public entities, the new litigation seeks the kind of
industry-wide changes in corporate products and practices that advo-
cates have pursued, without much success, in state and federal legisla-
tures.  Because of these special goals, I call these new lawsuits “social
policy torts.”
Public officials and private attorneys are collaborating on this
litigation, which also has the support of advocacy groups such as pub-
lic health organizations, gun control advocates, and consumer health
care advocates.  Because of their objectives and the configuration of
parties on the plaintiff side, these lawsuits have a political dimension
that is not generally present in other damage class actions.  Indeed,
these lawsuits bear more resemblance to the “social impact” litigation
that some 1966 Civil Rules Advisory Committee members said they
wanted to facilitate than do the consumer class actions and mass tort
class actions that RAND investigated.58  But unlike the attorneys who
traditionally litigated social impact class actions—who accepted less
than full-market wages in order to pursue their policy agenda—the
attorneys in these cases expect to reap large financial rewards if they
are successful.  These new suits have attracted particular attention for
at least three reasons: (1) the suits take on powerful industries that
have previously been able to prevent or limit regulation of their
products or practices; (2) they seek industry-wide changes that many
consider the exclusive purview of federal and state legislatures; and
(3) they ask for billions of dollars in damages.
A. Tobacco
For decades, tobacco companies successfully defended them-
selves against personal injury litigation by adopting a policy of in-
vesting whatever resources were necessary to avoid paying plaintiffs.
The companies well understood that settling with any smokers would
inevitably lead to the filing of more lawsuits.  No individual plaintiff
law firm had the resources to match those of the tobacco companies.
58. Interestingly, few of the journalists covering this litigation and few of the political
commentators seem to know that there is a long history of using class actions as a tool for social
policy change.
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By the 1980s, some mass tort plaintiff firms had acquired sufficient re-
sources and experience litigating mass claims to be ready to take on
the tobacco companies.  But when they tried to use the techniques
that had proved successful in other mass tort litigation against the to-
bacco companies, they too met with little success.59  The first class ac-
tion certified against tobacco manufacturers60 was also unsuccessful.
It was only when the state attorneys general and private class action
attorneys joined forces to pursue litigation (in a non-class form) on
behalf of state governments seeking reimbursement for the costs of
providing medical care to smokers that the manufacturers shifted
their strategy.  In exchange for protection against punitive damages
and future class actions the companies put billions of dollars on the
table and agreed to extensive changes in marketing practices.61  Al-
though the broad nationwide settlement envisaged by the attorneys
and the companies never came to pass, the manufacturers ultimately
settled with all of the states for a total of more than $240 billion.62
The $3.5 billion settlement negotiated with the companies by Missis-
sippi Attorney General Mike Moore was the first payment by the in-
dustry to compensate for tobacco-related injuries.63
The private lawyers who represented the states were hired by
state attorneys general under contingency-fee contracts that promised
fees ranging from ten to twenty five percent.64  Critics claimed that the
59. See Robert Rabin, Institutional and Historical Perspectives in Tobacco Tort Liability, in
SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURE (1993); Gary Schwartz, Tobacco Liability in
the Courts, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURE. at 131.
60. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co. 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995).  The certifica-
tion was withdrawn the following year.  See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th
Cir. 1996).
61. See CARRICK MOLLENKAMP ET AL., THE PEOPLE VS. BIG TOBACCO: HOW THE
STATES TOOK ON THE TOBACCO GIANTS (1998).  The settlement at the center of Mollenkamp
et al.’s tale was not adopted by Congress.  Ultimately, the states negotiated their own settle-
ments with the tobacco manufacturers.  A key factor in the success of recent litigation was the
release of documents indicating that tobacco manufacturers understood the health conse-
quences of smoking.  See RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES: AMERICA’S HUNDRED YEAR
CIGARETTE WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILLIP MORRIS,
(1996).  See also Paul Barrett, Jumping the Gun: Where Tobacco and Firearms Diverge, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 12, 1999, at 1 (citing conversations with Lawrence Tribe and David Kessler about
the role of whistle-blowers and bad documents in the successful litigation against tobacco manu-
facturers).
62. See Barrett, supra note 61.
63. See Profile of Mike Moore, <http://www.msnbc.com>.  After Moore filed Mississippi’s
lawsuit against the tobacco companies, Governor Kirk Fordice sued the attorney general to pre-
vent the suit from going forward.
64. See Barry Meier, Lawyers in Tobacco Case Will Receive $8.2 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
12, 1998, at 1.
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attorneys general selected these attorneys because they had contrib-
uted to the elected officials’ campaigns,65 but in fact the litigation
teams comprised the nation’s leading mass tort and class action law-
yers.  The lawyers who represented the first states to settle were
awarded $8.2 billion in fees by a panel of arbitrators.66
B. Guns
The attorneys pursuing litigation against the gun manufacturers
have said their efforts are modeled on the litigation against the to-
bacco manufacturers.67  Although some of the class action attorneys
who played prominent roles in the tobacco litigation have not joined
the litigation against gun manufacturers,68 the group of plaintiff attor-
neys that filed the Castano69 class action in the mid 1990s, led by
Wendell Gauthier of New Orleans, is a key participant. Some anti-
smoking advocates also have offered their support.  While noting that
his group expected to win substantial fees if successful, Gauthier ar-
gued that as a result of the litigation the gun manufacturers would be
forced to agree to regulations on manufacturing and marketing that
they have previously resisted.70  The suits against gun manufacturers
filed on behalf of municipalities variously seek changes in practice
and damages to cover public costs associated with gun violence, such
as police protection and emergency medical services, and some are
grounded on novel legal theories.71
The gun litigation demonstrates the power of large-scale litiga-
tion, whether or not pursued within a class action context, to capture
the attention of the public, the press, and decision-makers.  The suits
are a mix of cases filed by individual plaintiffs (e.g. victims of gun
violence or their families) and cases filed by cities and other public
entities.  Many of the suits brought by public entities are represented
by the same attorneys (e.g. the Center to Prevent Hand-Gun Vio-
65. See id. (quoting Professor John Coffee of Columbia Law School).
66. See id.
67. See Barrett, supra note 61.
68. For example, as of 1999, Richard Scruggs had declined to become involved.  Among his
reasons, according to a Wall St. Journal reporter who interviewed him, was a feeling that guns
are not wholly bad and uncertainty about whether “there’s so much money at the end of the
day” for a potential settlement.  The reporter noted that whereas cigarette manufacturers’ an-
nual revenues are about $45 billion, gun manufacturer sales total only about $1.4 billion annu-
ally. Id.
69. 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995).
70. See Barrett, supra note 61.
71. See John Gibeaut, Gunning for Change, 86 A.B.A. J. 48 (2000).
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lence),72 and the litigation is apparently being coordinated by public
officials, public interest lawyers, and private attorneys.  Reports on
the gun litigation virtually always link it to the tobacco litigation,73 fo-
cusing on the nationwide character of each, the attempts to shape in-
dustry practices where legislation has failed, and the connections
among lawyers in both sets of lawsuits.  Judges’74 responses to the liti-
gation also reflects these perceived connections.
The gun litigation also powerfully demonstrates the links be-
tween the new social policy torts and politics.  When the state of
Georgia passed legislation banning suits by municipalities against gun
manufacturers, the National Rifle Association’s Institute for Legisla-
tive Action predicted “in the next year, [we] think we can probably
get 25 or 30 more states to do the same thing.”75  By the spring of 1999
bills were being introduced in the U.S. Congress intended variously to
facilitate and oppose suits against the gun industry.76  When New
York City decided to join the gun litigation in spring 2000, reporters
speculated that Mayor Giuliani’s withdrawal from his state’s U.S.
Senate race had freed him to oppose the powerful industry and its al-
lies.
C. Managed Care
More than a dozen class action lawsuits have been filed against
managed care organizations,77 representing some fifty million persons
in the United States whose care is provided by health maintenance
72. See id.
73. For example, a report of a New York jury’s verdict against gun manufacturers moves
quickly from a description of the instant case and the jury’s decision to interviews with commen-
tators about the ability of the industry to withstand nationwide litigation.  See Derrick Jackson,
A Wound to the Gun Makers, LOS ANGELES DAILY J., Feb. 19, 1999, at. 6.
74. Rejecting Bridgeport, Connecticut’s complaint against the gun manufacturers, Judge
Robert McWeeny wrote: “When conceiving the complaint in this case, the plaintiffs must have
envisioned such settlements as the dawning of a new age of litigation during which the gun in-
dustry, liquor industry and purveyors of junk food would follow the tobacco industry in reim-
bursing government expenditures and submitting to judicial regulation.”  Ganim v. Smith &
Wesson, No. X06-CV-99-0153198S (Dec. 10, 1999) (quoted in Gibeaut, supra note 71).
75. Jackson, supra note 73. By December 1999, at least 10 other states had followed Geor-
gia’s lead. See Tom Schoenberg, District’s Gun Suit A Long Shot, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999, at
1.
76. See Doug Morgan, What in the Wide, Wide World of Torts is going On? First Tobacco,
Now Gun: An Examination of Hamilton v. ACCU-TEK and the Critics’ Lawsuits Against the
Gun Industry , 69 MISS. L.J. 521, n. 5 (1999). See also Schoenberg, supra note 75.
77. See Milt Freudenheim, HMOs, Under Attack, Face Supreme Court Test, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 4, 2000, at A1.
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organizations.78  Suits have been filed both by private attorneys and
state attorneys general.  Among the private attorneys are Ron Mot-
ley, a leading asbestos mass tort attorney, and Richard Scruggs, who
played a prominent role in the suits against tobacco companies in
1997 and 1998.79  Mr. Scruggs has described his role in the litigation as
an effort to force changes in health care policy that Congress has so
far not adopted.80  The class action lawsuits generally argue that
health care plans have breached their fiduciary duties to plan enrol-
lees by adopting various cost-control mechanisms.  The U.S. Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Pegram v. Herdich,81 holding that managed
care organizations cannot be sued for imposing such constraints, is
widely regarded as placing a major roadblock in the path of these
suits,82 but the future of the litigation remains uncertain.
* * *
The involvement of wealthy private class action attorneys has
encouraged some media and political critics to portray the new social
policy torts as examples of plaintiff attorney greed.  But the key ques-
tion raised by this litigation is the appropriateness of using litigation
as a governance tool.  Whatever the failures of the legislative process,
it generally operates in a public spotlight and provides regular oppor-
tunities for the electorate to hold their representatives accountable.
Interest groups with different perspectives may present their views on
the problems under debate and the evidence that supports those
views, and offer their preferred policy solutions.  Although the politi-
cal compromises that emerge from the legislative process distribute
costs and benefits to various interests—and reflect the relative power
of these interests—those who negotiate these compromises do not
have a direct financial interest in the outcomes.  When the goals of
litigation include policy-making—as plaintiffs have claimed with re-
gard to litigation against tobacco and gun manufacturers and man-
aged care organizations—it is appropriate to ask how well litigation
78. See David Savage, Cost-Cutting Consequences: An HMO liability case is being closely
watched by the lawyers who targeted tobacco companies, A.B.A. J. 30 (2000).
79. An article published in February 2000 opined: “If Herdich wins, HMO’s may replace
the big tobacco companies as the prime target of the nation’s trial lawyers.”  Id.
80. See id.
81. 120 S.Ct. 2143 (2000).
82. See Edward Walsh & Amy Goldstein, High Court Hands HMOs A Victory, WASH.
POST, June 13, 2000, at A1.
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conforms to our expectations of how policy ought to be made in a
democratic society.
V.  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Today in the United States and in some other countries as well, it
has become popular to rail against the excesses of the civil justice sys-
tem.  Large-scale litigation is the new “monster,” portrayed as a
product of entrepreneurial lawyers and greedy citizens, intent on se-
curing financial rewards for questionable claims.  In the United
States, many see the class action rule as the key to opening the mon-
ster’s cage and setting it free.  But large-scale litigation is the conse-
quence of socio-economic trends, not the cause of these trends.  If
there is a new “monster” at large, it is the rise of multi-national cor-
porations and the development of a global economy that bring with
them the potential for large-scale injuries resulting from worldwide
product consumption.  If there is a key that has unlocked the mon-
ster’s cage, it is the information science revolution and the develop-
ment of the Internet, which have provided the means for people to
become informed about such injuries and the tools for individuals,
organizations, and attorneys to organize to secure remedies.  The
question is not whether governments need to respond to such socio-
economic changes, but how.
The great question facing civil justice regimes in the United
States and elsewhere is what the role of the judiciary should be in re-
sponding to large-scale harms.  In the United States, where we have
historically relied on private solutions to social problems, it is highly
likely that we will continue to rely on the courts and private litigation
to resolve disputes arising out of personal injury and property dam-
age.  Traditional civil procedures, with their emphasis on individual
due process and individually crafted outcomes, were well suited to
personal injury and property damage litigation alleging particularistic
harms to diverse individuals.  Large-scale litigation challenges the in-
dividual values that lie at the heart of this traditional system.  The
challenge for courts is to develop tools for managing and resolving
large-scale litigation efficiently and fairly.
Judges, other public policy makers, and scholars are unlikely to
find the best means of developing these tools in normative discourse
that is ungrounded in the empirical realities of mass litigation.  To
choose appropriate procedures for managing and resolving large-
scale litigation, we need to consider carefully the practical conse-
quences of alternative procedures, including representative class ac-
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tions, bankruptcy, consolidation, and other forms of aggregation.
There is little hope that a knight in shining armor will emerge as a re-
sult of such study.  But we may learn how to harness the power of the
large-scale litigation monster to do more good than harm.
